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COMMENTARY: 
 
Carbon finance and the carbon market in China 
 
 
Xiang Yu and Alex Y. Lo 
Chinese carbon market is up and running, but private finance has not been fully utilized. 
Finance-friendly policies are needed to help the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitter to 
harness market forces for climate change mitigation.  
 The latest World Bank report on carbon pricing indicates that the world’s emission trading 
schemes (ETS) are currently worth about US$30 billion (ref. 1). ETSs create a market in which 
the rights to emit greenhouse gases (GHG) are traded among GHG-emitting entities. The trading 
of emissions allowances or credits in these carbon markets creates a price on carbon and can help 
mitigate GHG emissions at lower costs. The world’s largest carbon market is built upon the 
European Union (EU) ETS, with an emission cap of 2,084 MtCO2e in 2013.  China houses the 
second largest one, covering 1,115 MtCO2e (ref. 1).  
 China pledges to reduce its carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP by 40–45% by 
2020, compared with 2005 levels. The world’s largest national source of GHG emissions has 
recently embarked on one of the largest endeavours in tackling climate change. In 2011, China 
announced a plan to introduce mandatory ETSs to support GHG mitigation. Seven cities and 
provinces were appointed across the country to implement pilot emission trading. These pilot 
sites are located in various parts of China with different economic structures and development 
trajectories, including Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Chongqing, Shenzhen, Guangdong and Hubei. 
By June 2014, all seven pilot ETSs have started trading, at varying trading prices and levels of 
activity (Table 1). The first pilot phase is expected to complete in end of 2015 or 2016; it is 
intended to build experience and provide lessons for moving toward a national cap-and-trade 
system in the following years.  
Table 1 Traded volumes and average prices in the pilot ETSs (as of 22 August 2014)  
 
Beijing Shanghai Guangdong Shenzhen Tianjin Hubei Chongqing 
Launch date 28 November 2013 
26 November 
2013 
18 December 
2013 
18 June 
2013 
26 December 
2013 
2 April 
2014 
19 June 
2014 
Traded volume 
(tCO2e) 2,031,876 1,553,460 1,293,173 1,647,790 1,059,760 5,185,695 145,000 
Average price 
($US/tCO2e) 8.0 6.4 8.9 11.1 3.4 3.9 5.0 
Source: Shanghai Environment and Carbon Exchange ‘Carbon Market Express’ Vol. 37, August 
2014 (http://www.cneeex.com) 
 
With government strong support, these ETSs were approved and came into force within a 
short period of time, i.e. about 3.5 years (2011 – 2014) from preparation to official launch (ref. 
2). The market mechanism, however, is associated with a number of problems, such as poor 
GHG measuring and reporting practice, incomplete legal frameworks, non-compliance, 
ineffective enforcement and low penalties (ref. 3, 4). Apart from these technical and regulatory 
failures, the market itself remains illiquid, i.e. there are few participants and the volume of 
transactions is low. Failure to increase liquidity may affect the efficiency outcomes of emission 
trading, which is, in China, subject to a suite of institutional constraints not experienced by their 
European and American counterparts.  
 
In remainder of this commentary we discuss the financial potential for emission trading 
in China. The discussion is informed by a comprehensive review of literature and five in-depth 
interviews with representatives from the Chinese financial industry completed in mid-July 2014. 
These industry representatives are senior executives who have extensive experience and 
knowledge in China’s carbon finance, and have been actively involved in the Chinese CDM 
market and the pilot ETSs in various ways. They are members of management teams or 
department chiefs in leading Chinese entreprises enterprises that have already established carbon 
finance operations, including the general manager of a carbon asset management firm (a 
subsidiary of a ‘top five’ national power company), the strategic director of a consultancy firm 
specializing in low-carbon investment (a subsidiary of a leading private investment corporation), 
the general manager of the carbon finance department of an established state-controlled 
investment corporation, the director of the carbon trading department of a major environment 
exchange in China, and the dead of the corporate banking department of a leading national 
commercial bank in China. We summarize their comments and concerns about carbon finance 
and emission trading in China. 
 
 
Domestic carbon finance 
Commercial financial services are a critical element of a functioning and efficient carbon market. 
Private investment is the main source of climate mitigation finance globally (ref. 5). In China, 
however, financial institutions have played a rather passive role in advancing environmental 
interests (ref. 6). According to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, China’s investment in 
GHG mitigation has been dominated by public funds, whereas private funds are not the main 
source of climate finance (ref. 7). A number of structural problems contribute to the slow 
progress in directing private capital to the carbon market. Firstly, the regulatory and policy 
systems are not conducive to the deployment of climate finance. Regulatory standards and 
official data on emissions are far from complete and consistent, and this creates difficulties for 
financial institutions to assess the economic and environmental viability or risk of applications. 
Flaws in the legal system continue to exist and non-compliance is widespread. This raises the 
risk of financial frauds and gives little protection to investors in the event of financial 
breakdowns.   
Second, financial institutions lack incentives for participation. Domestic financiers are 
not strongly motivated to finance emission mitigation as they do not see climate change as a 
profitable investment option. Although state-owned banks consider climate related investment as 
a corporate social responsibility issue, they are yet to include climate impacts as key 
considerations of business development (ref. 7). Institutional investors are not very optimistic 
about the prospects of financial products linked to climate change. Some commercial banks have 
recently set up rudimentary carbon asset management services and funds, but most hesitate to get 
involved and the small ones do not possess adequate knowledge and expertise in climate finance. 
Progress in developing new financial products, such as climate debentures and climate insurance, 
is slow.  
 
Emission trading market 
Carbon markets should provide favourable conditions and incentives for financial institutions to 
offer financial services and produce new products. Yet there is a feeling among the industry 
representatives that the Chinese authorities are reluctant to open up the market to financial 
institutions, due to risk control considerations. The larger institutional environment is deemed to 
be not adequately supportive. 
Local governments are primarily responsible for designing and implementing the pilot 
ETSs. The problem is that not many government officials have adequate knowledge and relevant 
expertise in managing trading activities and the market generally. Financiers possess the 
expertise required to offer advice, but few of them have been brought into the decision-making 
process that determines how the ETSs will be set up and operated. It is not clear that financial 
institutions have made significant contributions to institutional development. Comparing the 
Western carbon markets, the level of finance involvement is relatively low in China. 
Some of the impediments are related to the top-down approach by which the ETSs are set 
up. In Europe, pro-trading business coalitions played a decisive role in in the establishment of 
the EU ETS. In contrast, the Chinese carbon market is primarily established and managed by 
administrative means, rather than being driven by businesses’ voluntary commitments to GHG 
mitigation (ref. 8). Most of the firms affected by the ETSs are large state-owned entreprises; they 
are generally willing to reduce their polluting operations to lower costs of production and 
cooperate with regulators (ref. 4). Although the new policies and regulations have created some 
market demand for emission allowances and credits, these entreprises concentrate on complying 
with regulatory requirements and have poor sense of comprehensive corporate carbon 
management and low interest in trading emission credits as a form of financial investment. As a 
result, corporate demand for advanced financial services linked to emission trading is weak. 
Many financial institutions, notably banks, lack motivation to engage with the domestic carbon 
markets. 
In addition, current policies unnecessarily reduce profitable investment opportunities. For 
example, futures markets account for a much larger share of global carbon trades than spot 
markets do. The former involve the trading of futures contracts, which allow delivery of a 
commodity (e.g. carbon credits) at a specified price and time in the future, whereas the later 
involve immediate delivery at a given price. However, currently only spot markets are allowed to 
operate in China. The spot markets are financially less attractive to financial service providers 
and investors, because they do not allow them to speculate on prices going up or down in the 
future and increase profit margins by speculation and risk-taking. This significantly reduces 
incentives for making financial investment in the carbon markets (ref. 9). From a financial point 
of view, therefore, the limited trading opportunities  are the main problem, rather than the lack of 
expertise on the part of financial institutions themselves. As one of our interviewees put it “The 
problem is not actually with financial institutions, but the scale of the market being not big 
enough, or too small to attract financial institutions”. 
 
Concluding remarks 
Low liquidity is currently the main weakness of the Chinese carbon market. The market scale has 
been compromised by weak corporate demand and excessive regulatory constraints. The variety 
of trading options and the number of trading partners are limited. Consequently, the Chinese 
carbon market remains narrowly defined and small, relative to other businesses and trading 
opportunities, and is still in a pilot phase and subject to future policy change. Expectations of low 
rates of return and policy uncertainties have reduced the motivation of investors and financial 
service providers to participate in emission trading.  
A robust financial system is essential for a carbon market to thrive. Low-carbon projects 
and technologies are capital-intensive and typically have long payback periods. Both initial costs 
and investment risks are high. The government is in a position to provide short-term solutions to 
the shortage of domestic finance for GHG mitigation. In the past few years, the Chinese 
government has made massive investments in developing renewable energy sources and 
improving energy efficiency (ref. 7). To leverage these successful official efforts, more private 
capital should be identified and mobilized, and eventually given a central role in financing GHG 
mitigation.    For example, banks need support from government, in the form of subsidies or tax 
benefits, to low their risks in providing low-carbon finance to firms. Carbon emission disclosure 
systems should be established to help investors and banks assess the risks of investment in low-
carbon projects. Professional training is needed for corporate environmental managers and 
technical bureaucrats to build capacity in emission control, monitoring as well as trading 
emission credits.  The carbon market should be made open to a variety of trading options, such 
as futures contracts, to promote financial product innovation and attract capital.   
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